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ACADEMY State/Civil Untimely (N/J)* 
1. SUMMARY: In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 
r·-~ . '"'-..,/ 
413 U.S. 472 (1973), this Court held that a New York statute by which 
the state would reimburse private schools for testing and record-keeping 
expenses violated the Establishment Clause. This appeal presents the 
question whether a New York lan to reimburse private schools for expenses -- -----
incurred in 1971-72 before the injunction in Levitt in reliance on the 
~ -____, -
was 
*The notice of appeal was filed within 90 days, but the appeal 
docketed approximately 15 days late. 
~ ~ ~~?4-~ 
~~~IL. 
- -2- -
Levitt statute also violates the Establishment Clause. There is also 
4lt a threshold question concerning the finality of the Ct. App. judgment. 
re ., 
2. BACKGROUND: Levitt involved a New York enactment, Chapter 
138, appropriating $28,000,000 to compensate nonpublic schools for the 
expenses of record-keeping and testing required by state law. For each 
school year, qualifying schools would receive $27 for each pupil in 
grades 1-6, and $45 for each pupil in grades 7-12. Payment would be in 
two equal installments: one between January 15 and March 15, and the 
other between April 15 and June 15. The Act excluded payment for 
religious instruction, but made no provision for determining whether a 
school's costs in complying with the testing and record-keeping require-
ments were less than the annual lump sum payment. 
In affirming the judgment of a three-judge court, this Court 
noted that among the services required by the state was the maintenance 
of a regular program of traditional internal testing to measure pupil 
achievement, and that the statute provided no means to assure that such 
internally prepared tests were free from religious instruction. Given 
the risk that some testing would be designed to inculcate students in 
the religious pre cepts of the sponsoring church, "the State [was] consti-
tutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not 
being usec for religious indoctrination." 11 3 U.S. at 480. Since the 
State had failed to provide such assurance, Chapter 138 violated the 
Establishment Clause: "this is so because the aid that will be devoted 
to secular functions is not identifiable and separable from aid to 
sectarian activities." 413 U.S. at 480. 
The effective date of Chapter 138 was July 1, 1970. The Levitt 
,-, - complaint was filed on July 30, 1970, but no preliminary relief was then 
,._/ 
sought. Consequently, appellee (a defendant in the ~evitt litigation) and 
c• 
- -3- -. e. . 
other private schools rec~ved payments under the Act for the entire 
1970-71 .school year, and received the first of the two payments scheduled 
for the 1971-72 school year. On April 11, 1972, the three-judge DC 
entered a preliminary judgment restraining the making of the second 
payment; on April 27, 1972, the DC declared the Act unconstitutional; 
and on june 1, 1972, the DC entered a permanent injunction. 
On June 8~ 1972, the New York 
legislature passed the Act at issue here, Chapter 996 of the Laws of 
1972. The Act confers jurisdiction on the New York court of claims "to 
hear, audit and determine" the claims of private schools for reimburse-
---. ~ --=--- ----
rnent of expenses incurred in rendering the mandated services covered by --------- - ~ ... - ---- - -Chapter 138. The Act authorizes the court of claims to consider, inter 
alia, that because of the Levitt injunction full reimbursement had not 
been made to private schools rendering the mandated services for the 
1971-72 school year; that the schools had provided the services for that 
year in reliance on the legislative representation that they would be 
reimbursed; and that "the legislature recognizes a moral obligation to 
provide a remedy whereby such schools may recover the complete amount 
of expenses incurred by them prior to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred 
seventy-two in reliance on the said representation." App. 25. 
Appellee filed this claim under Chapter 996 to recover the 
$7,347.29 it would have received in 1971-72 ·under Chapter lj8 but for 
the Levitt decision. Over 2,000 schools have filed such claims totalling 
~ ----approximately $11,000,000. Appellee's claim was selected to test the --- --validity of Chapter 996. 
The court of claims held that Chapter 996 violated the 
Establishment Clause, and grante d the State 's motion to dismiss. The 
e court found that 996 suffered from the same constitutional defects as 138, 
' since it failed to p r ovide any standards or guidelines by which the court 
L• 
- -4- -
could exclude sectarian uses of the lump sum payment. For the court to 
make the payments contemplated by 138, without such standards or guide-
lines, would violate the clear mandate of Levitt. The court considered 
itself foreclosed from taking proof on the nature of the services for 
which reimbursement was sought by this language in Levitt: 
"Since Chapter 138 provides only for a single per-
pupil allotment ... neither this Court nor the 
District Court can properly reduce that allotment 
to an amount corresponding to the actual costs 
incurred in performing reimburseable secular 
services. This is a legislative, not a judicial 
function." 
413 U.S. at 482. 
On appeal, the App. Div. (3d Dept.} affirmed by a 3-2 vote. 
Judge Greenblott, writing for the majority, agreed with the court of 
claims that 996 was indistinguishable from 138, but offered a different 
reason why the court of claims should not itself determine the amounts 
expended for identifiable secular services: such a determination would 
constitute the excessive entanglement between government and religion 
prescribed by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 602 (1971) . 
The N.Y. Ct. App. reversed and reinstated the claim on the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Herlihy in the App. Div. (The dissenting judges 
in the Ct. App. adopted Judge Greenblott's opinion.} Judge Herlihy 
read Chapter 996 to authorize "a po~t audit to determine whether or not 
the mandated services had in fact been performed by the claimant." 
"[T]he post audit, which in this case is to be performed by the court of 
claims will necessarily establish whether or not the amounts claimed for 
mandated services constitute a furtherance of the religious purposes of 
the claimant." Since the legislature had not intended any funds to be 
.... ,- allowed for the furtherance of religious purposes, "the burden will be 
rY 
upon claimant to prove that the items of its claim are in fact solely 
for mandated s e rvices." 
- -5- -
So construed, Chapter 996 was not invalid, in Judge Herlihy's 
opinion, under this Court's decision in Levitt. Nor was the one-time 
\
post audit by the court of claims impermissible under Lemon I, given the 
subsequent decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II). 
Lemon I invalidated a Pennsylvania statutory plan to reimburse 
~ 
sectarian schools for secular services on the ground that the statute 
fostered excessive church-state entanglement through its provision for 
ongoing state scrutiny of the educational programs of sectarian schools 
to ensure that state money would not be spent for sectarian purposes. -Bu sustained the DC's refusal on remand to enjoin payment of 
4,000,000 for services rendered prior to Lemon I in reliance on 
the statute. Speaking for a plurality of four, the Chief Justice said 
that this payment was constitutionally permissible because (1) it required 
only a final, ministerial post-audit, without continuing supervision; 
(2) any risk of aid to religion was minimized by the nonrecurring nature 
of the payment and by the past process of oversight; and (3) the single 
payment reflected the school's reliance on the state's promise of payment 
for services rendered before June 28, 1971. Justice White concurred in 
the judgment. 
Judge Herlihy held that this case was controlled by Lemon II. 
As in Lemor. II, the equity of reimbursement of the schools for expenditures 
incurred in reliance on the state statute outweighed the constitutional 
interests: Because the declaration of unconstitutionality came after the 
great bulk of mandated services had been performed, but before the date 
set for payment of the second installment, "the equitable considerations 
present in Lemon II are, if anything, heightened." And the values of the 
- Establishment Clause could be protected by requiring the audit of the claims 
I 
by the court of claims to serve the same purpose as the final post audit 
- -6- -
in Lemon II,with the burden on the claimant to identify the mandated 
• expenditures for which reimbursement was sought. 
3. CONTENTIONS: In appealing to this Court, the State 
contends that the N.Y. Ct. App. order reinstating the claim in the court 
of claims is a final judgment, for two reasons: (1) the order finally 
adjudicates the constitutionality of the underlying statute, leaving 
only the amount of payment to be tried in the court of claims, so that 
the constitutional issue may be res judicata in further appeals, barring 
ultimate review by this court; and (2) by adopting Judge Herlihy's opinion 
authorizing the court of claims to decide in each case whether or not 
the tests or other services were sectarian or furthered sectarian purposes, 
the Ct. App. itself fostered excessive entanglement and thus injected a 
new element of unconstitutionaltiy into the case. 
On the merits, the State contends that Chapter 996 violates the 
Establishment Clause, both as written because it fails to assure that aid 
would not go to religious indoctrination, see Levitt, and as construed 
because it fosters excessive entanglement between church and state, see 
Lemon I. The State says that Lemon II is distinguishable on the following 
grounds: (1) In Lemon II the thorough process of oversight that had been 
disapproved in Lemon I as entangling church and state gave assuran ce that 
state aid would not further religious purposes; in this case Chapter 996 
gives no such assurance. (2) To the extent that the Ct. App.'s con-
struction of Chapter 996 departs from the lump sum payments contemplated 
by Chapter 138, narrowing reimbursement to identified secular services, 
the decision is less eas i ly justified by the equity of the school's good 
faith reliance on the statutory promise to pay. (3) Finally, the 
r e mandated audit by the court of claims to determine the actual cos t o f t he 
L,I 
secular services provided by the schools goes beyond the f inal audit 
- -7-
contemplated by Lemon II and brings the case within the prohibitions on 
entanglement of Lemon I. 
4. DISCUSSION: The final judgment question seems close. The - --------
order reinstating the claim leaves some federal questions to be 
adjudicated; for example, the court of claims decision (after trial) will 
be reviewable to determine whether it has improperly reimbursed 
expenditures that were sectarian in nature. Thus the decision does not 
fall neatly into any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule in 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). But the Ct. App.'s order 
I 
does finally decide, 
con~ onality of 
an important federal 
as far as the New York courts are concerned, the 
the statute as construed by the Ct. App. Since this is 
issue and one that tovches on the legitimacy of 
~ 
-
extensive further proceedings,the Court may want to note probable jurisdi-
ction. See id. at 484-85. 
On~ ts, there are a number ~ roblems with the Ct. APR· 's 
reliance on Lemon II. First, Judge Herlihy's opinion fails to distinguish 
between expenditures made before the preliminary injunction and declaration 
of unconstitutionality in April, 1972, and those made during the balance 
of the school year. In Lemon II all the expenditures had been made before 
any injunction was entered and before any adverse decision -- a fact 
stressed by the plurality. See 411 U.S. at 204-207. Here, although many 
of the expenditures were doubtless contracted for before April, no inquiry 
into the presence of prior commitments seems to be contemplated. Judge 
Herlihy's opinion appears to consider only the June 1, 1972 date of the 
permanent injunction to be relevant. 
Second, the opinion provides minimal guidance to the court of 
claims in differentiating reimbursible 
reimbursible "religious" expenditures. 
"secular" expenditures from non-
In Lemon II the invalid statute 
- -8- -
had itself provided such guidance -- for example, by specifying "secular" 
{e subjects and providing for "approved" instructional materials, -- so that 
the final post audit required "only a ministerial 'cleanup' function, 
that of balancing expenditures and receipts in the closing accounting 
re 
.... " 411 U.S. at 202. Here, the only guidance is in the following 
passages of Judge Herlihy's opinion: 
"Pursuant to chapter 996 of the Laws of 1972, 
there is to be a post audit to determine whether 
or not the mandated services had in fact been 
performed by the claimant. While it is true that 
in Lemon II there had presumably been active super-
vision of the affairs of the school so as to insure 
that the acts for which reimbursement was to be 
made were not at least directly for religious purposes, 
the post audit, which in this case is to be performed 
by the Court of Claims, will necessarily establish 
whether or not the amounts claimed for mandated 
services constitute a furtherance of the religious 
purposes of the claimant ... 
.it is readily apparent that it was ne~er the 
intent of the Legislature that any of its funds were 
to be allowed for the furtherance of religious purposes. 
In this regard, the audit of the claims by the Court of 
Claims must serve the same purpose as the final post 
audit which was referred to in Lemon II (supra). Accord-
ingly, the burden will be upon the claimant to prove 
that the items of its claim are in fact solely for 
mandated services and the burden will be upon the Court 
of Claims to make appropriate findings in regard thereto. 
These passages are at best unclear and at worst seem to equate what was 
"mandated" by the state with what can permissibly be reimbursed. Yet 
as the Court observed in Levitt the services required by New York law 
included traditional internal testing designed_ to measure pupil achieve--
ment, 413 U.S. at 480-81; thus there is a substantial risk that com-
pensation for mandated services by the court of claims will include 
subsidation of religious activity. 
- -9- -
Third, to the extent that the court of claims departs from 
the legislative determination of what is reimbursible,* it not only 
weakens the reliance argument for permitting reimbursement, but it also 
by conducting a thorough inquiry into the expenditures of each of the 
2,000 private schools making claims -- runs the risk of entanglement far 
exceeding that involved in the final post audit in Lemon II. ------------
The court of claims may be able to solve some of these problems 
by expanding on Judge Herlihy's opinion (a good reason not to hold that 
there is a final judgment at this point), but the difficulties seem 
sufficient in any event to foreclose summary affirmance. 
The Court may want to postpone consideration of this case until 
two other appeals involving New York's latest legislative effort in this 
field are before it. These appeals, both from the same three-judge court 
judgment, are Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, No. 76-595 (filed 
on October 26, 1976), and La Salle Academy v. Committee for Public 
Education, No. 76-713 (filed November 22, 1976). Both are due for dis-
tribution before the January 14, 1977 Conf~rence (at the earliest). These 
appeals involve a 1974 New York statute providing for reimbursement of 
the "actual costs" of complying with state requirements for record-keeping 
and administration of state-prepared examinations. The three-judge court 
? 
struck down this legislation on the authority of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
U.S. 349 (1975), as having the primary effect of advancing religion. If 
this Court were to affirm that judgment, it could vacate the judgment in 
this case and remand for reconsideration, since many of the same expendi-
tures are involved in this case. 
.a *Judge Herlihy's opinion contemplates a departure from the 
9 legislative scheme at least to the extent that the legislature approved 
(in Chapter 138) payments according to a fixed per-pupil formula. The 
court of claims is to determine "whether or not the mandated services 






One final problem in this case is that the state is attacking 
4 s own law as unconstitutional. , ____________ _ This is probably not an Article III 
problem,since the state is defending its treasury. But the adequacy of 
the state's represenation of the constitutional interests may be of 
concern, especially in light of the fact that it is on the other side in 




The first step should be to call for a response. 
There is no response. 
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Court struck down New York's Mandated Services Act, ch. 138 of 
the Laws of 1970, in Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ., 413 
U.S. 472 (1973), the state legislature enacted ch. 996 of the 
New York Laws of 1972 to reimburse nonpublic schools for 
expenditures in rendering mandated testing and recordkeeping 
services for the second half of the 1971-1972 school year. The 
payments that would have been forthcoming had been enjoined by 
the three judge court in Levitt. The issue on the merits is 
whether Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II), 
permits New York to make this one-shot reimbursement, even 
though, unlike Lemon II, the 1970 statute was invalidated 
because it had the impermissible effect of advancing religion, 
and any effort at apportionment during an accounting might 
entail entanglement difficulties. 
-
Appellant argues that Lemon II does not establish a 
broad doctrine that a state may resurrect unconstitutional 
spending programs for parochial schools through the device of 
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a post-invalidation reimbursement measure. In appellant's 
view, Lemon II is a unique, if not sui generis ruling, where 
been declared 
on entanglement grounds the Court could say 
a post-audit reimbursement would be 
restricted to the non-sectarian activities of the recipient. 
Appellee counters that Lemon II is premised on general 
considerations of equity, and the same balance of factors 
applies here. 
II. THRESHOLD QUESTIONS 
A. Finality 
2. 
Both appellant and appellee argue that the New York 
Court of Appeals decision is "final" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257(2) (see Br. for Appellee 11). Even though further 
proceedings are contemplated -- an accounting in the New York 
Court of Claims -- the New York Court of Appeals rendered a 
"final judgment or decree" on the constitutionality of ch. 
996. 
1. Category (2) of Cox Broadcasting. Although 
application of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975), is a hazardous affair, as Justice White's broadly 
framed categories are not analytically precise, this appeal J ~ 
seem to fall, if but imperfectly, within category (2). Here, 
the federal issue --whether or not ch. 996 is facially 
unconstitutional because of a primary effect of advancing 






the State," and "will survive and require decision regardless 
of the outcome of further proceedings." Id. at 480. It is, of 
course, theoretically possible that appellee will not be able 
to show reliance or that the court of claims will throw up its 
hands and find that an apportionment cannot be made between 
appellee's sectarian activities and secular services. But the 
finality rule is concerned with probabilities, not sheer 
speculation. The statute in dispute recognizes that the 
recipient parochial schools have a claim of reimbursible 
reliance, and the New York Court of Appeals ruling stands for 
the proposition that a sound apportionment is possible. In all 
likelihood, the state will be liable in some amount regardless 
of the outcome in the court of claims. "Nothing that could 
happen in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of 
the case, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the 
federal question." Id 
What complicates the analysis, however, is the 
state's injection of a second ground of unconstitutionality 
the potential for "excessive entanglement" present in the 
accounting. There are two problems here. First, category (2) 
of Cox seems to require that the accounting itself not give 
rise to a federal question. See J. White's discussion of the 
eminent domain cases, 420 U.S. at 477 & n.6, and Radio Station 
WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945). However, the 
eminent domain cases are distinguishable. An appeal cannot be 






condemnation because the constitutional violation is not 
perfected until the question of "just compensation" is 
determined. See Grays Harbor Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 
U.S. 251, 256 (1917), cited in Radio Station Wow. Here, the 
second federal issue is fully present at the point of the New 
York Court of Appeals decision to remand for further 
proceedings. The question is what potential for "excessive 
entanglement" is present in requiring the accounting at all. 
A related Radio Station Wow problem is suggested in 
\ Charlie Aines' cert pool memo. Charlie wrote that new federal 
issues might arise in the course of the accounting itself. The 
one example he offered is where the court of claims 
erroneously permits payment for sectarian instruction, 
believing it to be a truly secular service. The answer I would 
give is that new federal issues can always arise as a result 
of factual determinations made during further proceedings. 
That offchance does not defeat finality. 
A second difficulty is the possibility that the 
entanglement question may take on a significantly different 
hue after the accounting has taken place. This point is 
suggested by Chief Justice Burger's determination in Lemon II 
that the entanglement question had become moot because the 
detailed state surveillance already had occurred. See 411 U.S. 
at 202. I would answer that the entanglement doctrine seeks to 
prevent exposure to intrusive state-church interaction. Lemon 




- - 5. That decision does not require that a scheme carrying a 
definite potential for "excessive entanglement" be permitted 
to run its course. The constitutional violation, if any, is 
complete with the state court decision to require such 
exposure. 
2. Category (3) of Cox Broadcasting. The state also 
tries to come within Cox's third category, "in which later 
review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the 
outcome of the case." 420 U.S. at 481. The state notes: 
Fi r st, the decision of the Court of Appeals is final 
as to the question of the constitutionality of the 
underlying statute. That issue is not again triable 
in the Court of Claims on remand. Further, since the 
Court of Claims' jurisdiction on remand is to 
determine the amount of payment only, it is possible 
that there could be no further appeal in the State 
courts because the issue of constitutionality will be 
res judicata in those courts, thus barring an appeal 
to this Court on the constitutional issue. 
(Juris St, p.3). Even assuming appellant's characterization of 
state practice is accurate, "this court will not be thus 
bound." Grays Harbor Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U.S. at 
257." 
3. Category (4) of Cox Broadcasting. The "last 
resort" of appellate attorneys is now category (4) of Cox 
Broadcasting, perhaps in addition to the equal protection 
clause. That section of the decision permits this Court to 
pass on a final state court determination of a federal i ssue 
in an otherwise interlocutory judgment "if a refusal 
immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously 
erode federal polciy .... " 420 U.S. at 483. This "virtually 
- formless exception to the finality requirement," id. at 505 
-





Considerations of Standing and Justiciability 
This case presents the unusual situation of the State 





unconstitutionality of the state statute creating those claims. 
I was surprised to learn that this issue has not been 
briefed at all. Appellee, represented by Davis, Polk & 
Wardwell (considered in my hometown to be a good law firm) 
does not even advert to this obvious difficulty with the 
appeal. Charlie Ames spotted the issue in his cert memo. 
Although he did not think there is an Article III problem 
because the state is defending its treasury, he suggested that 
"the adequacy of the state's representation of the 
constitutional interests may be of concern, especially in 
light of the fact that it is on the other side in No. 76-575, 
defending many of the same expenditures that it is attacking 
here." At conference, JJ. Rehnquist, White and Stevens voiced 
reservations about the state's standing to attack the validity 
of a state statute. I recommend calling for post-argument ~~ 
briefs on this issue. 
The following discussion reflects a preliminary vi:.z::;:._~~ 
of the question, subject to revision in light of further 
research and post-argument submissions. 
1. Concrete Adverseness. There can be no question 
that a bona fide controversy exists between the parties. The 
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reimbursement under the statute in question. Rather than 'h,.. , '1 · 
asserting a generalized interest held in common with the IA,. ":t:'~1 
~ ,c..,...,_.. 
public, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482-85 (1923); ~ V"!- . 
Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), it is defending a claim 
against its fisc. 
Nor is this a case where the state legislature has 
manfactured a controversy in order to obtain an advisory 
opinion from this Court as to the constitutionality of the 
statute. In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), 
which was decided prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 
1934, the Court found Article III infirmities in a "test case" 
statute. J. Day reasoned: 
It is true the United States is made a defendant to 
the action, but it has no adverse interest to the 
claimants. The object is not to assert a property 
right as against the Government, or to demand 
compensation for alleged wrongs because of action on 
its parts. The whole purpose of the law is to 
determine the constitutional validity of this class 
of legislation in a suit not arising between parties 
concerning a property right necessarily involved in 
the decision in question, but in a proceeding against 
the Government in its sovereign capacity, and 
concerning which the only judgment required is to 
settle the doubtful character of the legislation in 
question. 
219 U.S. at 361-62. 
Similarly, the state's acknowledgement of the 
unconstitutionality of its statutes does not have usual effect 
of a confession of er r or or of realignment with the position 
of the adverse party. Here, the controversy proceeds__jl ith -- ~ 
requisite adverseness of interest. Compare, e.g., United ----------------- - --
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 306 (1946) (Congress 
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SG joined in two of the respondents' contentions challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute); Cheng Fan Kwok v. 
Immigration Service, 392 U.S. 206, 210 n. 9 (1968) (special 
counsel appointed as amicus in support of judgment below 
because the INS had decided to align itself with petitioner). 
Under the modern decisions, the State of New York has 
alleged the "injury in fact" or particularized harm that is 
considered the irreducible minimal requirement for Article 
III standing. See,~-~-, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). There may be 
sound prudential considerations for barring the state from 
interposing its defense here, but these do not seem to be of 
constitutional dimension. 
2. The State's Interest. Generally speaking, state 
and local bodies or officers cannot go into federal court and 
seek a determination that state statutes they are compelled to 
enforce or implement are in violation of the federal 
Constitution. 
A municipality is barred from such actions on the 
theory that it is merely a creature of the state and cannot 
invoke the federal Constitution "in opposition to the will of 
its creator." Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); 
Trenton 
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Newark v. New Jersey, 262 
U.S. 192 (1923). 
Public officials may not bring such challenges 
because they lack the requisite "personal interest" in the 






283 U.S. 96 (1931}; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 
208 U.S. 192 (1908}; Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 
9. 
138 (1903}. These decisons also hold that "the authority of a 
public officer to assail in the courts of the State the 
constitutional validity of a state statute is a local 
question," Columbus & Greenville Ry, 283 U.S. at 99, and does 
not control for Article III purposes. 
There are some important exceptions. On occasion, 
the public official is held to have the requisite personal 
stake in the outcome. State legislators have been found to 
have standing to attack the efficacy of ratification of a 
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution because of "a 
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the 
effectiveness of their votes." Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
1 
433, 438 (1939} . 
In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n. 
5 (1968}, the Court, per J. White, found standing in a board 
of education to challenge a state statute requiring local 
public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to 
students in parochial schools. With no discussion of the 
conflicting signals in earlier decisions, J. White noted: 
Appellees do not challenge the standing of appellants 
to press their claim in this Court. Appellants have 
taken an oath to support the United States 
Constitution. Believing §701 to be unconstitutional, 
they are in the position of having to choose between 
violating their oath and taking a step - refusal to 
comply with §701 - that would be likely to bring 
their expulsion from office and also a reduction in 
state funds for their school districts. There can be 
no doubt that appellants thus have a "personal stake 
in the outcome" of this litigation. Baker v. Carr, 






Of course, Coleman and Allen are not very helpful 
here. It is the state itself which is raising the defense of 
constitutional invalidity. And even if the Court were willing 
to go beyond the formal designation of parties, see United 
States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) (United States in the role 
of plaintiff and statutory respondent), and recognize that it 
is the state attorney general who is interposing the defense, 
the latter cannot plausibly argue that he, too, is facing a 
Hobson's choice, as in Allen, or is simply seeking to 
vindicate the effectiveness of his particular governmental 
role, as in Coleman. 
There is a line of authority recognizing the standing 
of an administrative or executive official to defend the 
constitutionality of the legislation which he is charged with 
administering or enforcing, say, in seeking review in this 
Court from a state court decision invalidating a state statute 
on federal constitutional grounds. According to the plurality 
opinion in Coleman, state officers "have an adequate interest 
in the controversy by reason of their duty to enforce the 
state statutes the validity of which has been drawn in 
question." 307 U.S. at 445. Justice Frankfurther, in his 
separate opinion in Coleman, stated that "an official has a 
legally recognized duty to enforces statute which he is 
charged with enforcing," and may "ask this Court to remove the 
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~ ~~1-~ 
misconception of the ~ ~~ court because of an asserted 
Constitution." Id., at 466. 
The question here is whether the state's interest in 
protecting its treasury, even from state-law authorized 
disbursements is sufficient for Article III purposes, or 
whether the state, qua state, cannot raise a claim in this 
Court which is contrary to its own statutes. 
The case law is of little aid in answering this 
question. The decisions discussed above were handed down at a 
time when the Court did not attempt to separate out prudential 
considerations from constitutional command in discussions of 
standing. 
J 
My ten ta ti ve view is that when a state is in the J IJ.-},,,t<,,(. 1 
a&.-D ~Ld'::: ,0. 
posture of a defendant resisting a claim made on its treasury~~ 
it has standing, as a constitutional matter, to interpose all S~$ 
pertinent defenses to liability, including an attack on the Si;:;:::::, 
state statute creating the claim. The presence of an adverse ,t__.~ 
claimant to state funds argues against the possibility of t•:~ 
collusion and offers some assurance of adequate representation 
by the state. That the federal claim is interposed in a 
defensive posture is some guarantee that the state is not 
asking this Court to render an advisory ruling as to the 







A state may seek review in this Court of a state 
court's invalidation of a state statute on federal 
constitutional grounds, if the federal question arose as a 
defense whether interposed by the state in an action against 
it or by the adverse party in an action by the state to 
enforce a state obligation. It is doubtful, however, whether 
the state could institute an original action in state court to 
test the validity of its statute, and then seek review of an 
adverse ruling in this Court. 
The decisions discussed above tend to support this 
distinction, but by way of illustration rather than explicit 
discussion. However, at least two of the old decisions do not 
reflect my suggested distinction. See Columbus & Greenville 





These decisions are inconclusive. In Columbus & Greenville 
Ry., the Court reviewed the facial constitutionality of the 
state statute even though it had found that the state tax 
collector lacked the requisite personal interest to raise its 
due process contentions. 
Smith v. Indiana involved an action in state court 
against a county auditor who had refused to allow the 
plaintiff an exemption granted by a state statute on the 
ground of unconstitutionality. The state courts upheld the 
statute. The Court found the auditor lacked a "personal 
interest in the litigation" and "was testing the 
constitutionality of the law purely in the interest of third 
persons, viz., the taxpayers ..•• " It concluded "that the 
defendant, having sought the advice of the courts of his own 
state in his official capacity, should be content to abide by 
their decision." Id. at 149. The Court was also troubled by 
the failure to litigate the auditor's authority to disregard 
the state exemption law: "[t]he celerity of the proceedings 
and the admissions of counsel indicate that the suit was begun 
and carried on for the purpose of testing the constitution-
ality of the law, and that the litigation was at least not an 
unfriendly 
collusion, I would note that Board of Education v. Allen found \ 
one." Id. , at 148. Aside from this suggestion of 






3. The State Against Itself. The mere fact that the 
State is acting against its own statute does not, standing 
alone, take the case outside of Article III. Although we have 
to await the state's explanation at oral argument, it is 
possible that the statute has simply changed its mind. The 
state comes to this Court representing a single position; no 
indication appears that the governor or the legislature 
opposes this appeal. Perhaps, state law authorizes the state, 
through its Attorney General, to interpose any and all 
pertinent defenses, including unconstitutionality, in a state 
2 
court of claims proceeding. If so, this appeal begins to 
resemble cases like United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), 
where the Court has entertained an otherwise justiciable 
controversy even though statutes create the "anomalous" 
situation of having the United States, through the Attorney 
General, "appear on both sides of the same controversy." Id., 
at 431. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 306; United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) and cases cited 
therein. 
The "courts must look behind names that symbolize the 
parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy 
is presented." United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 430. Given 
the fact that the state has alleged a particularized grievance 
and advances but a single position in this appeal, the 






the constitutionality of a state statute is a question of 
3 
state law. The courts below entertained the state's 
defense, without raising any question of state power or 
propriety. The "anomaly" presented by this case does not 
represent an Article III barrier. 
15. 
4. Prudential Considerations. Charlie Ames suggested 
that adequacy of representation may be a problem because the 
state is called upon in other cases to defend similar schemes 
for financial assistance to parochial schools. 
This is not a case where because of a realignment in 
position by the normally adverse party, the Court is deprived 
of a thorough ventilation of the opposing considerations. See 
Milliken v. Bradley, No. 76-447 {decided June 27, 1977) 
{Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Here, appellee can 
be expected to make all of the arguments that the state 
ordinarily would make, and the state's pocketbook concerns 
' will lead it to oppose vigorously appellee's claim. Perhaps, 
the state might decline to make a particular argument, say, 
that the legislature entertained an improper purpose, out of 
fear that its position in this case will come back to haunt in 
subsequent cases. I would think that often the Government 
frames its arguments in a particular case with an eye to the 
effect its current position may have on subsequent 
controversies. Ordinarily, this consideration is not thought 
!~ to undermine justiciability. I do not think it is a 
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This appeal does not present a "political question," 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Resolution of 
establishment clause controversies is a matter committed to 
the judicial branch. The related argument might be made that 
there is a state inter-branch conflict lurking behind this 
appeal, and the Court should stay its hand in such a case. The 
short answer is that on the surface of things this is not an 
inter-branch dispute. Moreover, the Court does not ordinarily 
shrink from inter- or intra-branch conflict in the federal 
system, provided the elements of justiciability are present. 
No reasons springs to mind why a different rule should be 
4 
adopted for the states. 
One final point. A refusal to find standing in the 
state will result in the expenditure of public monies under a 
reimbursement scheme which may be a subterfuge for evading 
this Court's ruling in Levitt. It may be too late for a 
citizen or taxpayer to bring suit at this point to compel 
appellee and the other schools to refund unconstitutional 
receipts. 
III. THE MERITS 
The issue on ~he merits is whether ch. 996 falls 
within the special rationale of Lemon II, i.e., whether Levitt 
is to be given purely prospective effect. The setting here is 
slightly different from Lemon II: a second statute is drawn in 
"'-""'~ ,-
question, and the original plaintiff is inexplicably out of 
the case. But the underlying issue is the same. 
-
-
- - 17. 
A. Lemon II 
On June 28, 1971, the Court struck down 
Pennsylvania's statutory program to reimburse nonpublic 
sectarian schools for certain secular educational services. 
The Court bypassed the issue of unlawful effect in favor of 
invalidation on entanglement grounds. The defect found in 
Lemon I was that the state undertook a continuing surveillance 
of the instructional programs to insure that services 
"purchased" by the school were not provided in connection with 
sectarian teaching. On remand, the DC entered summary judgment 
and enjoined payments of state funds for educational services 
performed after June 28, 1971. The plaintiffs challenged the 
limited scope of the injunction, seeking to prevent payments 
for services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year. 
This Court in Lemon II affirmed. Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for four Justices, held that the trial court 
acted within its equitable discretion in declining to issue a 
broader decree, and that the proposed distribution of state 
funds would "not substantially undermine the constitutional 
interests at stake in Lemon I." 411 U.S. at 201. 
The plurality opinion identified the following 
factors in support of its conclusion that reimbursement in 
that case "require[d] no compromise of the basic principle of 
Lemon I" (411 at 202): 
ii:, 1. The "impact of the single and final post-audit." 
.-- / Any potential for "excessive entanglement" present in the 
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disputed sums would "compel no further state oversight of the 
instructional processes of the sectarian schools. The 
post-audit process would be a "one-shot" affair, "involving 
only a 'cleanup' function," and "in that setting a minimal 
contact with the affairs of the State." 411 U.S. at 202. 
2. A one-time, non-recurring payment to parochial 
schools. The arguable constitutional interest in barring any 
payments to parochial schools would be "implicated only once 
under special circumstances that will not recur." 411 U.S. at 
202. 
3. Assurance that state funds would not be applied 
for sectarian purposes. The "very process of oversight--now an 
accomplished fact"-- that had condemned the statute would 
serve as a guarantee against any impermissible primary effect. 
411 U.S. at 202-03. 
4. The equities of the situation. The Court placed 
considerable emphasis on "the expenses incurred by the schools 
in reliance on the state statute inviting the contracts made 
and authorizing reimbursement for past services performed by 
the schools." 411 U.S. at 203. The significance of this 
reliance interest was reinforced by the plaintiffs' failure to 
press for interim suspension of the payments pendente lite. It 
was only after Lemon I -- six months after the contracts for 
the 1970-1971 school year had been perfected and after all 
services under those contracts had been performed -- that 
plaintiffs made clear they would seek to block the payments 
due. Id. at 204-05. Furthermore, the schools' reliance on the 
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impression. "[T]his is not a case where it could be said that 
appellee acted in bad faith or that they rel i ed on a plainly 
unlawful statute." Id. at 207. 
B. Application of Lemon II to this Case 
If Lemon II is read narrowly, to require the presence 
of each of the factors identified in the plurality opinion, 
ch. 996 must fall. 
There are some points in common with Lemon II. Ch. 
996 is a "one-shot" disbursement, and thus any political 
divisiveness caused by the payments will be short-lived. And 
Levitt was not "clearly foreshadowed" by prior decisions in 
light of the Court's suggestion that a statute providing for 
reimbursement of required services other than teacher-prepared 
examinations may be constitutional. See 413 U.S. at 482. With 
respect to the other factors identified in Lemon II, however, 
this case is significantly different. 
1. Procedural Posture. Unlike Lemon II, where the 
plaintiffs had not sought any injunctive relief until after 
this Court's decision, here the Levitt plaintiff sought and 
obtained a preliminary injunction on April 11, 1972, four days 
before the earliest date on which the second payment for the 
1971-1972 school year could have been made. The three judge 
court declared the original statute unconstitutional on April 
27, 1972. It issued a permanent injunction on June 1, 1972. 
, This Court decided Levitt on June 25, 1973. Appellee's claim 
is based on a statute enacted in response to Levitt. 
This difference in procedural posture has a bearing 
on the issue of reasonable reliance. In Lemon II, all the 
• 
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expenditures had been made before any injunction was entered, 
and indeed before any adverse decision. See Roemer v. 
Maryland Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 n.23 (1976). Here, 
~ ~ re is a serious question whether expenditures made after 
,+~ April 11, 1972, or at least avoidable expenditures after that 
~- da~ are constitutionally reimbursible. Justice Herlihy's 
?,' opinion, which was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals, 
~ does not address this point. 
1,-o t/JJ More importantly, the Court in Lemon II was 
-
-
reviewing the scope of a district court's decree for abuse of 
discretion, and it held that the equities in that case 
permitted a withholding of complete relief. See 411 U.S. at 
200-01. In Levitt, the three judge court had granted interim 
injunctive relief. The state legislature seeks by positive 
enactment to undo that injunction, and to attach a 
prospective-only effect to this Court's ruling. Of course, 
this Court is not bound by the state's characterization, but a 
decision upholding ch. 996 may well encourage similar revisory 
legislation by state legislatures dissatisfied with this 
Court's religion clause pronouncements. Moreover, ch. 996 does 
not even attempt to correct the defects identified in Levitt. 
The legislature simply reinstated the lump-sum, per-pupil 
payments that had been enjoined by the three judge court. 
2. No assurance of permissible primary effect. Given 
the legislature's failure to address any establishment clause 
infirmities, ch. 996 on its face does not distinguish between 
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where there is a danger of sectarian input. That was the 
primary defect identified in Levitt, see 413 U.S. at 480; 
compare Wolman v. Walter, No. 76-496 (decided June 24, 1977), 
slip op. 7-9 (standardized tests and scoring services). In 
Lemon II, by contrast, the "excessive entanglement" that 
condemned the statute provided strong assurance that 
reimbursement payments would not entail an impermissible 
primary effect. 
Indeed, even J. Herlihy's opinion is deficient on 
this score. He offers the following "guidance" to the court of 
claims: 
[I]t is readily apparent that it was never the intent 
of the legislature that any of its funds were to be 
allowed for the furtherance of religious purposes. In 
this regard, the audit of the claims by the Court of 
Claims must serve the same purpose as the final post 
audit which was referred to in Lemon II (supra). 
Accordingly, the burden will be on the claimant to 
prove that the items of its claims are in fact solely 
for mandated services and the burden will be upon the 
Court of Claims to make appropriate findings in 
regard thereto. 
(Juris St, App. B, at Al6). J. Herlihy appears to be equating 
what was mandated by the state with what can be permissibly 
reimbursed under the establishment clause. This runs counter 
to the observation in Levitt that the "mandated services" 
i ncluded traditional internal testing designed to measure 
pupil achievement. See 41 3 U.S. at 480-81. 
3. Risk of "Excessive Entanglement." Unlike Lemon II, 
where entanglement was an accomplished fact, here an ~ 
"entangling" accounting is necessary to cure any primary 1.4,~ - ________ .-...._ ____________________ _
effect of advancing religion. Appellee argues that a judicial 
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1971-1972 school year is constitution/both on grounds of 
remoteness and because this is not an ongoing administrative 
surveillance of the affairs of church-related schools. 
Appellee is right that retrospectivity and judicial 
supervision make this case different. But the core concern of 
the entanglement doctrine is nonetheless implicated. Appellee 
and the other parochial schools will not be able to receive 
state funds unless they can convince state administrators and 
judges that the services rendered do not contain a religious 
component. Disputes are bound to occur, the resolution of 
which will require the determination by state officials of 
whether particular tests or other services were performed with 
a noble heart and mind or with an evil, i.e., sectarian, 
purpose and input 
4. Attenuated Reliance Interest. The statute in Lemon 
I authorized the state to "purchase" specified "secular 
educational services" from nonpublic schools, a scheme which 
permitted the state to reimburse directly such schools for 
actual expenditures for teacher's salaries, textbooks. and 
instructional materials. See 403 U.S. at 609. Given the fact 
that the assistance was not necessarily keyed to services 
mandated by state law, the recipient schools in Lemon II could 
--- --=w:s --argue with some force that absent the reimbursement 
"contracts," they might have reduced some of these 
expenditures, and that they faced a serious hardship if the 
expected payments were not forthcoming. See 411 U.S. at 203 & 
n.4. 
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made in any event because they related to "mandated services" 
(Juris St, App. B, at A3). The schools can still argue that 
absent the state reimbursement scheme they might have cut back 
non-mandated services and programs. But this claim of reliance 
is a step removed from Lemon II. Moreover, to the extent the 
accounting results in payments which are less than what would 
have been reimbursible under the fixed per-pupil formula of 
the earlier statute, the claim of reliance is further 
weakened. See majority op. in the App. Div. (Juris St, App. B, 
at A9) • 
Of course, ch. 996 contains a legislative finding 
that the schools have a claim of reimbursible reliance (see 
Juris St, App.E, §2(d), (f)-(h), at A24-A25). However, this 
Court must make its own determination of the issue of reliance 
in deciding the temporal effect of the Levitt ruling. 
C. The Consequences of a Broad Reading of Lemon II 
Appellee argues for an expansive reading of Lemon II, 
to the effect that an establishment clause ruling that is not 
"clearly foreshadowed" by prior law should be denied effect in 
the very case prompting the ruling, at least where there is a 
claim of reliance because the plaintiff failed to obtain 
interim injunctive relief. There is language in Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion which would support such an interpretation. 
I recommend against an extension of the rationale of 
Lemon II to reach this case. Lemon II was itself an unusal, if 
not aberrational ruling. Although neither due process nor 
Article III prohibits the technique of purely prospective 
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Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Great Northern R. Co. v. 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), that is not 
the usual practice in constitutional adjudication. Even in the 
criminal rights area, where the state's interest is weightier 
and the claim of reliance more compelling than in this case, a 
ruling rejecting retroactive application still redounds to the 
benefit of the petition~r in this Court. The cases cited by 
Chief Justice Burger do not support his operative assumption 
that complete prospectivity is indicated unless reimbursement 
will "substantially undermine the constitutional interests at 
stake in Lemon I." 411 U.S at 201. Justice Douglas' statement 
of the law is more accurate: "Only a compelling circumstance 
has been held to limit a judicial ruling to retrospective 
application." Id. at 211. See also Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, No. 75-6568 (decided June 17, 1977) (Powell, J. 
concurring in the judgment). 
Although it may seem unfair to allow but "one chance 
beneficiary--the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the 
occasion for announcing the new principle--[to] enjoy 
retroactive application," Hankerson (Powell, J.), it makes 
little sense to deny even such limited retroactive effect. 
Sound constitutional adjudication requires that aggrieved 
individuals be given an incentive for challenging old 
' doctrines which have fallen into desuetude, or even doctrines 
of recent vintage which were simply wrongly decided. Lemon II 
weakens the incentive. State legislators interested in 
providing aid to religious schools should have to operate 
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survive constitutional attack. Lemon II removes this potential 
for legislative self-correction and encourages evasion of this 
Court's rulings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, I believe that the New York Court of Appeals 
ruling is "final" for §1257(2) purposes, even though it is 
difficult to peg this case to one of the Cox Broadcasting 
categories. My tentative view is that the state has standing, 
subject to what may come out in the post-argument briefs. On 
the merits, the New York statute does not satisfy the 
conditions for complete prospective applications, as set forth 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (CADC 
1974) (U.S. Senator held to have standing to challenge 
presidential pocket veto during Congressional recess because 
of allegations of deprivation of his effective vote and right 
to participate in veto override effort), with Holtzman v. 
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (CA2 1973) (no standing to 
challenge legality of Cambodia bombing where right to vote on 
appropriations for Indo-China hostilities was not denied or 
rendered effective). 
2. In the state court of claims, the state, through 
its Attorney General, contended that ch. 996 was ineffective 
under both the state and federal constitutions. See App. 
33-34, 49-51. This would seem to be a traditional role of 
state attorneys general. 
3. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 437-38; Smith 
v. Indiana, 191 U.S. at 148. 
4. As to the question of the state's third-party 
standing to assert the right of the people to be free of 
public assistance in violation of the establishment clause, 
the state can argue that non-recognition of this defense will 
result in the unconstitutional expenditure of public monies. 
By resisting appellee's claim, the state is preserving its 
fisc and is at the same time preventing a violation of the 
rights of the third-party public. This situation satisfies a 
critical element of the jus tertii doctrine. See Craig v. 
Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 





SUPPLEMENT TO BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: Sept. 30, 1977 
No. 76-616--New York v. Cathedral Academy 
I. WAS ENTANGLEMENT AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT IN LEMON II? 
The Pa. statute in Lemon authorized the state supt. of 
education to "purchase" specified "secular educational 
services" from nonpublic schools by entering into "contracts" 
reimbursing the schools for actual expenses for teachers' 
salaries, textbooks and other instructional materials. 
The statute provided the following safeguards to provide ~ 
some modicum of insurance against aid to sectarian functions or 
activities: (1) Reimbursement was barred for any course 
containing religious subject matter. (2) Aid was limited to 
four secular subjects ( mathematics, modern foreign languages, 
physical science, and physical education). (3) Textbooks and 
other instructional material had to be approved in advance of 
use by the supt. (4) Recipient schools had to maintain a 
prescribed accounting procedure to identify the "separate" cost 
of the "secular educational service." See Lemon I, 403 U.S. at 
609-10. 
In finding impermissible entanglement, the Lemon I Court 
stressed the following features: (1) the requirement that 
schools had to maintain prescribed accounting procedures which 
would permit a separate identification of the cost of secular 
instruction; (2) the fact that the aid went directly to the 
schools; and (3) "the government's post-audit power to inspect 




- -determine which expenditures are religious and which are 
secular .... " 403 U.S. at 621-22. 
In Lemon II, Chief Justice Burger, assumed without 
2. 
explanatory discussion, that "the entangling supervision ~~ 
prerequisite to state aid had already been accomplished," / 411 
U.S. at 203n.3. The plurality opinion states: 
Under the Act, the Superintendent's supervisory task was to 
have been c9~ leted long ago, during the 1970-1971 school 
year itself; noth ing i n the record suggests that the 
Superintendent did not faithfully execute his duties 
according to law. Hence, payment of the present disputed 
sums will compel ~o further state oversi ght of the 
instructional processes o~ s ec t arian schools. 
Id. at 202. In the plurality's view, only a post-audit of a 




The brief for the Commonwealth of Pa. in Lemon II indicates 
that most of the "entangling" features of the statutory scheme 
had become accomplished facts, although I think the Court in 
Lemon II overstated the degree of "detailed state surveillance 
of the schools." 411 U.S. at 202. 
1. The secular subject requirement. The state argued that 
while the schools were bound by contract to remove any 
sectarian input from instruction in the four subjects, "the 
Commonwealth, in determining a school eligible for 
reimbursement must be conclusively presumed to have made a 
determination that such a school in no wise violated the 
statutory and constitutional obligation of secularity of 
instruction. On what basis this determination was made --
whether by classroom surveillance or otherwise it is legally 
presumed to have been made." (Br. for Appellee 20). At oral 
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or duties have been properly performed" {Tr. 43). At one 
point, the attorney for the Commonwealth conceded he did not 
know how the supt. of education enforced the secularity 
requirement {Tr. 45). 
2. Textbooks and other instructional materials. The Pa. 
statute referred to implementing regulations by the state 
education dept. These regulations, promulgated before the 
Court's decision in Lemon I, required advance approval of the -
textbooks to be used by the schools under the program. {Br. 
20-21) • 
3. Post-audit power. The state had every interest in 
minimizing this feature of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, 
the post-audit did not involve classroom monitoring or 
surveillance, but rather an audit of accounts pertaining to 
"the cost of secular educational service." No discretion 
remained at the post-audit stage. The determination of whether 
a school's expenditures were religious or secular in character 
had already been made when the supt of education entered into 
"contracts" with the various schools {Br. 22-23). 
4. Disqualification of Certain Recipient Schools. 
Apparently, a few parochial schools were denied "contracts" 
because their by-laws and public brochures contained references 
to the role of God's revelation in all instruction {Tr. 47). 
There was dispute between the parties over whether some 
instances of disqualification took place after Lemon I {compare 
Suppl Br. of Appellants 2-4, with Suppl Br. of Appellees 1-3). 
correct l y ~ 
In sum, the Lemon II Court/ assumed that any significant ~-/-o 
~4.--- ~ 




- - 4. the Court did not carefully examine the quality of the state 
supervision to assure itself that any impermissible primary 
effect, an issue which was not reached in Lemon I, had been 
cured. Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
II. A FURTHER EFFORT AT DISTINGUISHING THE INSTANT CASE FROM 
LEMON II 
Lemon II should be read as a special case involving a 
confluence of factors which rendered appropriate the Court's 
affirmance of the DC's refusal to bar the reimbursement of 
schools which had fully performed their end of the contracts 
for the school year, all before any injunction or adverse 
ruling by any court. Lemon II, in my view, does not stand for /;j}~ 
the proposition that good-faith reliance on a statute /~ 
~ i 
subsequently declared to be unconstitutional is always 
sufficient to require purely prospective overruling. 
I do not wish to duplicate my discussion at pp. 19-25 






derived in part from my reading of the transcript and briefs in 
Lemon II. 
A. The Likelihood of Improper Effect in the Absence of Prior, 
Curative Entanglement 
The 1970 New York statute was held unconstitutional on 
......... 
/ceffect grounds, whereas the Pa. measure was invalidated on an 
entanglement rationale, the Court pretermitting the issue of 
impermissible effect. Presumptively, the New York statute 
presents a more compelling case for invalidation, because 
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is really a secondary doctrine which does not ordinarily come 
into play except as a limit on the state's power to cure the 
primary effect of assistance to religious schools. An unlawful 
effect must be cured by government supervision, but the cure 
cannot itself violate the Constitution through "excessive 
entanglement." These conditions were met in Lemon II, but they 
are not really present here. 
While the entangling supervision that took place in Pa. was 
hardly thorough, the Pa. scheme provided some basis for the 
Court's presumption that the reimbursement monies would not be 
going toward sectarian activities, and that there would be no 
need for further policing. The problem with the New York 
meausre, by contrast, is that it carries forward the infirmity ----- - ----.... 
of the 1970 statute struck down in Levitt. "[N]o attempt is 
made under the statute, and no means are available to assure 
that internally prepared tests are free of religious 
instruction." 413 U.S. at 480. 
~1. 
~ 
The judicial accounting ordered by the New York Court of 
Appeals, through the vehicle of J. Herlihy's dissent, does not 
provide an adequate cure for the defect identified in Levitt. 
First, the dissent does not state in unequivocal fashion 
that the schools are not to be reimbursed for mandated services 
which have a religious component. J. Herlihy erroneously 
equated mandated services with permissible services. His 
awareness of the possibility that the schools might ask for 
more than they actually expended for mandated services is 
commendable. His opinion, however, is not responsive to the 
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teacher-prepared examinations and other instructional 
materials unavoidably involve a sectarian component. Compare 
Wolman v. Walter, slip op. 7-10 (standardized tests), with id. 
at 17-20 (instructional materials). 
A state court failure to provide proper safeguards to 
remove the primary effect of an aid program is ground alone for 
reversal, or at the very least a remand for clarification. 
Second, assuming J. Herlihy's dissent can be construed in 
accord with constitutional requirements, the accounting in the 
court of claims will involve an "entangling interference" with 
the operation of parochial schools, although admittedly one 
that would be retrospective and conducted under judicial 
supervision. However minimal the administrative supervision and 
statutory requirements in Lemon II, the Court was able to find 
the post-invalidation remibursement scheme to be substantially 
congruent with the earlier Lemon ruling, without requiring 
further state oversight. There is simply no basis for such 
assurance here. 
B. Attenuated Reliance 
At the oral argument in Lemon II, the attorney for the 
Commonwealth emphasized the direct reliance of the recipient 
schools on the statute in expanding their curriculum and 
instructional resources. The purpose of the reimbursement 
scheme, he said, was to enhance the quality of the schools. The 
statute encouraged the nonpublic schools to expand their 
facilities (e.g., hiring a calculus teacher, including Spanish 
in the curriculum), replace religious textbooks with secular, 
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requirement, develop separate accounting systems, and improve 
the administration of teacher certification and standardized 
tests, etc. {Tr. 34-37) . 
~~·~ 
The schools in this case cannot make the sa~ of "µ ~ 
direct reliance. As far as the record shows, the public fun~ ~ 
did not directly result in increased expenditures. The App. ~ 
Div. majority found : "The payments were not contingent upon~~ 
performance of the [mandated] services since said services were ~ 
independently required." {Petn, App. B, at A3). Apparently, the 
lure of public funding did affect budgeting decisions with 
respect to non-mandated services, a good part of which must 
have related to the sectarian functions of the school. 
C. A New Statute and a New Litigation 
The element of deference to district court equitable 
discretion cuts the other way in this case. Moreove r , appellee ---~ 
is asking for a broad prospective-only ruling to bar 
application to a separate reimbursement statute, not simply the 
statute which prompted the Levitt ruling. 
D. Clarity of Establishment Clause Law in 1971 
A small point {perhaps only a makeweight argument): in all 
likelihood Lemon I was on the books (June, 1971) at the point 
of reliance in this case. Although Lemon I sidestepped the 
question of improper effect, the Court did note that "[t]he 
Pennsylvania statute ... has the further defect of providing 
state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This 
factor distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in both cases 
the Court was careful to point out that state aid was provided 
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school." 403 U.S. at 621. Admittedly, Levitt was not "clearly 
foreshadowed," but nor was it as clear a case of first 
impression as Lemon itself. 
* * * * 
In sum, Lemon II can be fairly read as a narrow, 
factor-specific decision. A different mix of the pertinent 
factors may justify a different result. 
III. THE POINT OF REASONABLE RELIANCE 
Even if Lemon II controls, the Court should provide some 
guidance to the New York Court of Claims to ensure that 
unconstitutional payments are not made. Ch. 996 authorizes 
payments for the period between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1972. 
Since it is likely that not all of the expenditures made after 
the DC's prelim inj dated April 11, 1972 were budgeted for 
prior to the injunction, ch. 996 may be unconstitutionally 
generous in any event. 
Second, any amibiguity in J. Herlihy's decision must be 
resolved in favor of a construction of ch. 996 which would bar 
payments for (1) claims in excess of actual expenditures for 
mandated services, and (2) claims for mandated services 
requiring parochial school teacher preparation or involving 
other indicia of potential sectarian input. 
S.E. 
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: October 5, 1977 
-
Re: No. 76-616--New York v. Cathedral Academy 
I could not find anything in this Court's Levitt 
opinion or in the briefs filed by New York in Levitt which 
supports New York's apparent assertion in this case that 
in all probability a school's expenditures for clearly 
constitutional services (health and attendance records, 
state-prepared examinations, etc. ) would exceed the 
statutory allotments. As the Court pointed out in Levitt, 
the state "insisted that since teacher-prepared 
examinations are required by state regulation they are 
included within the services reimbursed under the Act." 
413 U.S. at 475 n.3. 
However, the state did argue that the costs of 
performing the "mandated services" generally would exceed 
the statutory payments. And there was also evidence that 
the costs of administration of only three required, 
state-prepared tests would amount to $19.00 per pupil, as 
contrasted with the statutory formula of $27.00 per pupil 
at the elementary school level and $45.00 per pupil at the 
secondary level. (Br. for Appellant 11). Nonetheless, we 
do not know the extent to whcih teacher-prepared 
examinations and other services carrying a potential for 
sectarian input contribute to the overall cost figure for 
"mandated services." This Court in Levitt struck down the 






per-pupil allotment for a variety of specified services, 
some secular and some potentially religious," and the 
courts could not "properly reduce the allotment to an 
amount corresponding to the actual costs incurred in 
performing reimbursable secular services." 413 U.S. at 482. 
S.E. 
- ~-"-3· • 
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State of New York, Appellant, l O 1 f h C f n Appea rom t e ourt o 
v. Appeals of New York. 
Cathedral Academy. 
[November __J_' 1977) 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court, 
In April of 1972 a three-judge United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York declared unconstitu-
tiona.J New York"s Mandated Services Act. 1970 N. Y. Laws 
c. 138, which authorized fixed payments to nonpublic schools 
as reimbursement for the cost of certain recordkeeping and 
testing services required by state law. Com,mittee for Pub-lie 
Education and R eligious Liberty v. Levitt, 342 F. Supp. 43!J. 
The Court·s order permanently enjoined any payments under 
the Act. including reimbursement for expenses that schools 
had already incurred in the last half of the 1971-1972 school 
year. 1 This Court subsequently affirmed that judgment. 
Levitt v. Cornrnittee for Public Education , 413 U. S. 472. 
In June of 1972 the New York State Legislature responded 
to the District Court's order by enacting Chapter 996 of the 
1972 Laws of N. Y. The Act "recognize[d] a moral obligation 
to provide a remedy whereby . . . schools may recover the 
complete amount of expenses incurred by them prior to June 
1 The order permanent)~- enjoined "all persons ac ting fo r or on behalf 
of the State of Kew York from m11 king an~· payment ,- or d isbursements 
out of StMe fund,; pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 138 of the New 
York u1w,; of 1970, in pa~·ment for or reimbursement of any moneys 
h eretofore or lwreafter expended 'by ilOl1,PUbli,e elemenh1r)' _a-nd seconda ry 
.sc11ools.'·' 
~'}11 




2 NEW YORK v. CATHEDRAL ACADEMY 
thirteenth '[1972] in reliance on" the invalidated c. 138. and 
conferred jurisdiction on the New York Court of Claims "to 
hear. audit and determine" the claims of nonprofit private 
schools for such expenses. Thus the Act explicitly authorized 
what the District Court's injunction had prohibited: reim-
bursement to sectarian schools for their expenses of performing 
state-mandated services through the 1971-1972 academic year. 
The appellee. Cathedral Academy, sued under c. 996 in the 
'Court of Claims. and the State defended on the ground that 
the Act was unconstitutional.~ The Court of Claims agreed 
that c. 996 viola.ted the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and dismissed Cathedral Academy's suit. Cathedral Academy· 
v. State, 77 Misc. 2d 977. 354 N. Y. S. 2d 370. The Appellate 
Division affirmed. 47 App. Div. 2d 390, 366 N. Y. S. 2d 900, 
but the New York Court of Appeals. adopting the dissenting 
opinion in the Appellate ·Division. reversed and remanded the 
case to the Court of Claims for determina,tion of the amount 
of the Academy's claim.~ ·39 N. Y. 2d 1021. 355 N. E. 2d 300. 
The State brought an appeal to this Court. and we postponed 
further consideration of the question of our appellate juris-
diction until the hearing on the merits. . 429 U. S. 1089. We 
conclude that the Court of Appeals' ·aecision fina1ly determined 
the federal constitutional issue a1id is ripe for appellate review 
in this Court under 28 l:. S. C. § 1257 (2).'1 
2 At om! argument the Assi:;t rmt St,Ji,iiut General of New York explained 
that, despite the apparent anomaly, the State of New York frequent!~, 
defend,; claims for p:1~·ment on tlw ground that. tlw enabling act authorizing 
snit in the Court of Cl11im:s i:s nncon:;titutionnl. She pointed out tlmt 
otherwise therr would br no menns of testing the con8titutionality of 
legislation authorizing or mandating pn~·ments from public funds. 
"The di:ssenting judges in the Court of Appeab voted to affirm on the 
majorit~- opinion in the Appellate Division. 39 N. Y. 2d. lit 1022, 355 
X. E. 2d, at -. We ,;hall refer to t.he opinion of the dis;:;enting jrn;tices 
in the Appellate Division. adopted b~- the majorit~- in the Court of Appeals, 
as the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
1 It i,; clear that the New York Court of Appeals has finall~- determined 
that u11der the ~)rinciples eiltab!ished in [..;emon v, Kurtznum, 411 U.S. 192 
4+/o '" ey 
- -
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The state courts and the parties have all considered this 
casf' to be controlled by the principles established in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. 411 U. S. 192 (Lemon fl) . which concerned the 
permissible scope of a federal district court injunction for-
bidding payments to sectarian schools under an unconstitu-
tional state statute. Previously in that same litigation we had 
declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute authorizing 
payments to sectarian schools for specific secular services 
provided under contract with the State. and remanded the 
case to the trial court for entry of an appropriate decree. 
Lenion v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 ( Lemon I). On remand. 
the District Court enjoined payments under the statute for 
any services performed after the date of this Court's decision , 
but did not prohibit payments for services provided before 
that date. 348 F. Supp. 300. 305 (ED Pa.). In Lemon I I 
this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of retroactive 
injunctive relief against the State, noting that "in constitu-
tional adjudication as elsewhere. equitable remedies are a 
special blend of what is necessary. what is fair . and what is 
workable." 411 U. S .. at 200 (footnote omitted). 
The primary constitutional evil that the Lemon I I injunc-
tion was intended to rectify was the excessive governmental 
entanglement inherent in Pennsylvania's elaborate procedures 
for ensuring that "educational services to be reimbursed by 
(Lemon I I) , the Academ~· and other schools in similar positions are 
entitled to prove clnims for reimbursement under c. 996. While the Court 
of Appeal.,; remnnded for an ~rndit in the Court of Claims to determine the 
amount of the Acndem~· •,. claim, nnd while the prf'c ise scope of the audit. 
i~ unclear, we conclude for the reasons stated in the text below at 
that, no pos,;ible developments on remand could suffi cient)~- minimize the 
risk of future constitutional harm to ju,;tif~· relief even under Lemon's 
balnncin~ of constitutional and equitable considerations. Since further 
proceeding,; cannot remo,·e or otherwise affect this thre:;hold federal issue, 
the Court of Appea ls' deci::;ion is final for purposes of rev iew in this Coui·!. 
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 478. 
- -
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the State were kept free of religious influences.'' 411 U. S .. 
at 202. The payments themselves were assumed to be con-
stitutionally permissible. since they were not to be directly 
supportive of any sectarian activities. Because the State's 
supervision had long since been completed with respect to 
expenses already incurred. the proposed payments were held 
to pose no continued threat of excessive entanglement. Two 
other problems having "constitutional overtones"-the impact 
of a final audit and the effect of funding even the entirely 
nonreligious activities of a sectarian school-threatened mini-
mal harm "only once under special circumstances that will not 
recur. " Ibid. 
In this context this Court held that the unique flexibility 
of equity permitted the tria.l court to weigh the "remote 
possibility of constitutional harm from allowing the State to 
keep its bargain" against the substantial reliance of the schools 
that had incurred expe11se~ at the express invitation of the 
State. The District Court. "avplying familiar equitable prin-
ciples." could properly decline to enter an in.iunction that 
would do little if anything to advance constitutional interests 
while working considerable hardship on the schools. Cf. 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321. 
In the present case. however. the District Court did not 
llmit its decree as the court had done in Lemon II, but instead 
expressly enjoined payments for amounts "heretofore or here-
after expended." See 11. 1. supra ( emphasis supplied). The 
state legislature thus took action inconsistent with the Court's 
order when it passed c. 996 upon its own determination that. 
because schools like the Academy had relied to their detriment 
on the State's promise of payment under c. 138. the equities of 
the case demanded retroactive reimbursement. To approve 
the enactment of c. 996 would thus expand the reasoning of 
Lemon I! to hold that a state legislature may effectively 
· modify a federal court's in.iunction whenever a balancing of 
~Qnsti'tutional equities might conceivably have justified the 
- -
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court's granting similar relief in the first place. But cf. 
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451. 467. 
This rule would mean that every such unconstitutional statute, 
like every dog. gets one bite. if anyone has relied on the 
statute to his detriment. Nothing il1 Lemon I I , whose con-
cern was to "examine the District Court's evaluation of the 
proper means of implementing an equitable decree." 411 U.S. , 
at 200. suggests such a broad general principle. 
But whether c. 996 is viewed as an attempt at legislative 
equity or simply as a law authorizing payments from public 
funds to sectarian schools. the dispositive question is whether' 
the payments it authorizes offend the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
II 
The law at issue here. c. 996, authorizes reimbursement for 
expenses incurred by the schools during the specified time 
period 
" in rendering services for examination and inspection in 
connection with administration, grading and the com-
piling and reporting of the results of tests and examina-
tions. maintenance of pupil health records, recording of 
personnel qualifications and characteristics and the prep-
aration and submission to the state of various other 
reports required by law or regulation." 
It expressly states tha.t the basis for the legislation is the 
State's representation in the now invalida.ted c. 138 that such 
expenses would be reimbursed. Thus. while c. 996 provides 
for only one payment rather than many, and changes the' 
method of administering the payments, nothing on the face of 
the statute indicates that payments under c. 996 would differ 
in any substantia.l way from those authorized under c. 138. 
Unlike the constitutional defect in the state law before us 
in Lemon I , the constitutional invalidity of c. 138 lay in the 
payment itself, rather than in the process of its administration. 
- -
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The New York statute was held to be constitutionally invalid 
because "the a.id that [wouldl be devoted to secular functions 
[ was] not identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian 
activities." Lem:tt, supra, 413 U. S .. at 480. This was so 
both because there was 110 assurance that the lump-sum 
payments reflected actual expenditures for mandated services, 
and because there was an impermissible risk of religious indoc-
trination inherent in some of the required services themselves. 
We noted in particular the "substantial risk that examina-
tions. prepared by teachers under the authority of religiou!5 
institutions. will be drafted with an eye. unconsciously or 
otherwise. to inculcate students in the religious precepts of 
the sponsoring church." Ibid. Thus it ca.n hardly be doubted 
that if c. 996 authorizes payments for the identical services 
that were to be reimbursed under c. 138, it is for the identical 
reasons invalid. 
The Academy argues. however. that the Court of Appeals 
has construed the statute to require a detailed audit in the 
Court of Claims to "establish whether or not the amounts 
claimed for mandated services constitute a furthera.nce of the 
religious purposes of the claima11t." 47 App. Div. 2d. at 397, 
366 K. Y. S. 2d. at 906. This language is said to require the 
Court of Claims to review in detail all expenditures for which 
reimbursement is claimed. including all teacher-prepared tests. 
in order to assure that state funds are not given for sectarian 
activities. w ·e find nothing in the opinions of the state courts 
to indicate that such an audit is authorized under c. 996." 
" The Comt of Claims dif'mi~~ed the Acndemy '.,: claim in part becnuse 
it found " no enforceable "tand:1rd8 or guideline>'" in c. 996 "which would 
ennble I-his court to sep:irnte :ind :1pportion the single per pupil allotment 
nmong the ,·arious :1llowrd purpose.,: .'" 77 '\Iise. 2d, :ir 985, :354 X. Y. S. 
2d . :i t ~70. Thu,: it· did 11ot belic,·r ih:it r. 996 m1thorizcd it to rrimbmse 
,:chool" on!~· for clr,nl~· .,ert:1rian rxpen~e", such n,; the co,,:t of maintaining 
a ttendnnre nnd medir:1I record,,:, while refu.,:ing pn~·ment,,: for other "a llowed 
pnq,o,,:es' ' ,.:uel1 n::; in-clas::; ex;:i mi1wtion~ thnt this Coqrt had held imr,er .. 
- -
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But even if such an audit were contemplated , we agree with 
the appellant that this sort of detailed inquiry into the subtl<=: 
implications of in-class examinations and other teaching 
activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on 
the protections of the First and Fqurteenth Amendments. I,~ 
order to prove their .claims for . reimbursement. sectarian 
schools would be placed in the position of trying to disprov~ 
any religious content in various classroom materials. In order 
to fulfill its duty to resist any possibly unconstitutional pay-: 
ment. see tl. 2. supra, the Stat~ as defendant would have t9 
undertake a search for religious mea.ning in every classroom 
examination offered in support. of. a claim. And to decide th~ 
case. the Court of Claims would be cast in the role of arbite1· 
of the essentia.lly religious dispute. 
The prospect of church and state litigating in court about 
what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very 
core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establish-
ment. and it cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only. 
once. Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hill 
M emorw.l Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440. ·when it i~ 
considered that c. 996 contemplates claims by approximately 
mi,;sible. The opinion of the Comt of Appeals does not contradi ct this 
interpretation. • 
. While the languagf' quoted in t.he text is somewhat ambiguous, it appea rs 
thaJ. the Court of Appeab i11terpreted c. 996 to require an audit simila r to 
the po,;t -nudit eontemplated in Lemon II. in which " the bmden will be 011 
the claimant to pro,·e tlrnt. the items of it,; claims a re in fact sole!~· for 
mandated se rvices." 47 App. Div. 2d , nt 400. 366 N. Y. S. 2d, at - . 
A"' was made rlear in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education. supra, 
howe,·er, :1 limitation on reimbursement to mandated se rvice,; would not 
full~· addres;; the const itutional objections to c. 138, since it would provide 
no :1,;surnnce against reimbursement for ,;ectarian mandated services . Thus, 
fl po8t-audi t like the one contemplated in Lemon II . which the Court. 
cha ra cterized as a. " rnini ,;terial 'clea n-up ' function," 411 U. S., nt 201..: 
,rn1~d !lot in this rase exclude payments that imperrni;;sibly aided religious 
pmposes. 
- -
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2,000 schools in amounts totalling over $11 million dollars. the 
constitutional violation is clear.41 
For the reasons stated. we hold tha.t c. 996 is unconstitu-
tional beca.use it will of necessity either have the primary 
effect of aiding religion. see Levitt v. Committee for Public 
Educati<m, supra, or will result in excessive state involvement 
in religious affairs. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 
III 
But even assuming. as the New York Court of Appeals did. 
that under Lenwn I I a degree of constitutional infirmity m~y 
be tolerated in a. state law if other equitable considerations 
predominate. we cannot agree tha.t the equities support what 
the sta.te legislature has done in c. 996. 
In Lemon I/ the constitutional vice of excessive entangle-
ment was an accornplished fact that could not be undone by 
enjoining payments for expenses previously incurred. And 
precisely because past practices had clearly identified per-
missibly reimbursable secular expenses. a.n additional single 
payment Wf\S held not to threaten the additional constitu-
tional harm of sta.te support to religious activities. I3y 
contrast, c. 996 amounts to a new and independently significant 
·1nfringement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Moreover the Academy's detrimental reliance on the promise 
of c. 138 was materially different from the reliance of the 
schools in Lemon II. Unlike the Pennsylvania schools. the 
Academy was required by pre-existing state law to perform 
the services reimbursed under c. 138. In essence. the Academy 
could have relied on c. 138 only by spending its own funds for 
nonma,ndated. a.ncl perhaps sectarian. activities that it might 
not otherwise have been able to afford. While this Court has 
never held that freeing private funds for sectarian uses 
6 The parties have considered the Acndemy 's claim a test of the con-
stitutionality of c. 996. Claims filed by other schools have been stayed 
111 the Court of Claims pending the resolution of this case. 
- -
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invalidates otherwise secular aid to religious institutions, see 
Roenier v. Maryland Public J-Vorks Board, 426 U. S. 736. 747 
n. 14 (plurality opinion). it is quite another matter to accord 
positive weight to such a reliance interest in the balance 
aga.inst a measurable constitutional violation. 
Accordingly. the judgment of the New York Court of 
Appeals is rev~rsed. and the case is remanded to that court for 
further ,proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It 1-0 so ordered. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN,JR. 
-
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November 16, 1977 
State of New York v. Cathedral Ac ademy 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE J O HN PAUL STEVEN S 
November 16, 1977 
RE : 76-616 - State of New York v. Cathedral Academy 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me . 
Mr . Justice Stewart 
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CHAMBE.RS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 21, 1977 
Re: No. 76-616, State of New York v. Cathedral Academy 
Dear Potter: 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
- -.;§u.pumt {!f onrl llf flrt ~th .;§tatts 
jiraslp:nghm. ~- <!f. 211.;iJt.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 22, 1977 
Re: No. 76-616 - State of New York v. Cathedral Academy 
Dear Potter: 
Would you please add at the end of the circulating 
draft opinion in this case the following: 
"Mr. Justice Rehnquist believes that this 
case is controlled by the principles 
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 
192, and would therefore affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals of New York." 
Though I do not plan to write anything myself, I reserve 
the right to join any other dissenting opinion or statement 
that may commend itself to me. 
Sincerely, . rtfi 
\J 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS or 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
- -
j;u:p-rnn:t <!Jattrl of tlrt 'Jlfui±t~ ~taf:tg 
Jfas-Iyinghm. ~- ~- ZOffe~~ 
November 22, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-616 - New York v. Cathedral Academy 
I am having printed the following statement in 
this case: 
Mr. Justice White, dissenting. 
Because the Court continues to mis-
construe the First Amendment in a manner 
that discriminates against religion and is 
contrary to the fundamental educational 
needs of the country, I dissent here as I 
have in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971); Conrrnittee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. 
Committee, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975, aiiciwolman 
v. Walter, 45 USLW 4861 (1977). 
~ 
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CH AMBERS OF 
JUST IC E HAR RY A . BLAC KM UN 
1tr rur Iri:ttgfott. II). <Q:. 2.0 .;i)!. .;t 
Rochester, Minnesota 
No vember 28, 1977 
Re: No . 76-616 - New York v. Cathedral Academy 
Dear Potter : 
✓ 
Please join me. On balance, I would much prefer to 
ha v e footnote 2 omitted. I doubt if it r e ally adds m uch, and it 
may cause confusion rather than assistance in the future. What-
ever you decide to do about it, I am with you in any event. 
Sincerely, 
H.A. B. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conf e rence 
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~it.Slp:ngbm. ~. <q. 2.llffeJl., 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE November 30, 1977 
RE: 76-616 - New -York v. Cathedral Academy 
Dear Potter: 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
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